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To what degree do economists disagree about key economic questions? Our self-image as a profession would be that our views on economic questions are based on the accumulated academic evidence, both theoretical and empirical. As a literature first develops, the evidence will still be ambiguous, with both alternative theories and contradictory empirical estimates, easily leading to disagreements. But as evidence accumulates, a professional consensus should emerge, perhaps more quickly among those working in the relevant field.
An alternative perception, reflecting the traditional fresh-water/salt-water divide in macroeconomics, is that economists coalesce into different camps, to a degree reflecting a liberal/conservative divide, with one group focusing on evidence that government intervention is almost always too costly ex post to be justified and another that market failures are all too frequent and can be alleviated by well-designed policy interventions. Compounding this divide is differences in the degree of importance given to distributional vs. efficiency implications of alternative policies.
These camps have traditionally been associated with particular universities, with Chicago, Rochester, UCLA, and Stanford arguably reflecting the conservative camp, and MIT, Harvard, and Berkeley reflecting the more liberal camp. Such a division could also show up among Ph.D.'s from different schools, who each received training from a different set of faculty.
There may also be generational divides among economists, with a changing consensus reflecting not so much each of us changing our views based on the accumulating evidence, but instead those with out-dated views gradually retiring and being replaced by younger economists whose views rely on more recent evidence.
This perception of different camps among economists is reinforced by the use of economic spokespeople for Presidential candidates and sitting Presidents. The job of such a 3 spokesperson is to defend the politician's positions in public, regardless of the economic advice the spokesperson is giving internally, assuring a perception of politicized views. This perception is reinforced by the media's use of economists with polarized views in their pointcounterpoint debates.
These spokespeople are also under pressure to be "one-armed" economists, avoiding the many qualifications coming out of the academic literature. Even non-spokespeople can be subject to an "expert bias", a bias towards more certainty than is justified, with this bias perhaps stronger for men than women.
A hybrid view would be that economic priors (conservative vs. liberal) matter when the empirical evidence is weak, but not when the empirical evidence is strong. The degree of polarization would then depend (negatively) on the depth of the associated economic literature.
To provide evidence on the degree to which there is a consensus vs. polarized camps of economists, we make use of the responses to a series of questions posed to a distinguished panel 1 Panel members could "strongly agree", "agree", be "uncertain", "disagree", or "strongly disagree" with the statement, or alternatively decline to express an opinion or simply not answer. Members also indicated their confidence in their response, on a scale from one to 1 Both panelists and the general public are welcome to suggest questions. Draft versions of the question are usually sent to panelists in advance, who have the opportunity to point out problems with wording or suggest improvements. This process minimizes the chance that a question will be vague or hard to interpret. The questions and each respondent's answers can be found at http://www.igmchicago.org/igm-economic-experts-panel.
ten. The description of the data and of our empirical methods is described in the next section, along with the resulting estimates. Section II then provides a brief summary.
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I. Empirical Evidence
The first question we face in the analysis is how to define differences in views among our panel members. Consider for example the responses to the question asking whether the Fed's new policies in 2011 will increase GDP growth by at least 1% in 2012. The responses were 41%
"uncertain", 37% "disagree", and 17% "strongly disagree". Initially, we assume that these responses imply consensus, since no respondents "agree" even though respondents differed in their extent of disagreement with the statement.
By this definition, there is an extraordinarily high level of consensus among our Panel members. 3 Only 6% of the responses in our data violate this definition of consensus, responding "disagree" when the consensus is "agree", or conversely. 4 Similarly, for 32 out of the 80 questions, there are no such disagreements.
Disagreements are not confined to questions where one might expect polarized views.
The greatest disagreement, for example, arose with the following statement from May 23, 2012, where opinions were almost equally divided between "agree", "disagree", and "uncertain" (or "no opinion"): "New technology for fracking natural gas, by lowering energy costs in the United States, will make US industrial firms more cost competitive and thus significantly stimulate the growth of US merchandise exports." Yet there is no obvious partisan division on this issue.
What we'll argue later is that such disagreements are much more common when the academic literature on an issue is small, as is the case for "fracking".
In spite of these observed differences in responses, though, views among our Panel might 6 still be homogeneous. This could occur if each individual responds randomly, reflecting ambiguities in the evidence and disagreement with some elements of a statement but agreement with other parts. To allow for such random responses, we now assume under the null hypothesis that the probabilities of any of the three possible answers to a given question are the same for all respondents.
To test whether all individuals have the same probabilities, we first tabulated the number of times each individual agreed with the consensus, was uncertain, or disagreed with the consensus. 5 We modeled these counts as coming from a multinomial distribution, with probabilities differing by question, and conducted a chi-square test of homogeneity to judge whether the distribution of responses was consistent with individuals having a common set of response probabilities.
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The resulting test strongly rejects homogeneous responses, with a p-value less than 0.001.
Deviations, though, take many forms: some individuals are much more likely to disagree with the consensus, some are more likely to agree, and others are more likely to be uncertain. Results are reported in Table 1 . To aid in interpretation, the table provides marginal effects evaluated at the means of the other covariates. In the first specification, we find that men are 8 percentage points less likely to be uncertain compared to women. This is a sizeable effect
given that one-fourth of individuals answer "uncertain" on average. None of the other coefficients are statistically significant. Using a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of all the personal characteristics other than effects of gender on being "uncertain", we find a pvalue of 0.73, showing no systematic differences in views other than men being more likely to express an opinion.
This first specification has not controlled for question characteristics, which could be important since some questions evoke more consensus than others. We therefore added the following additional controls to capture systematic variation by question in the fraction giving each response: a dummy indicating that the response follows immediately from undergraduate price theory, a dummy indicating a large academic literature on the topic, a dummy indicating at least a few academic publications on the topic, an indicator for whether responses could reflect distributional concerns and an indicator for whether responses could differ depending on views about the efficiency of the relevant markets.
10 Table 1 . Multinomial Logit Estimates of the Probability of "Uncertain"
and "Reject Consensus" Relative to "Agree with Consensus". Note that the coefficients on the individual characteristics are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls in the second specification. In principle, individual non-response patterns could have been correlated with characteristics of the questions. By finding no change in these individual coefficients, we infer that non-responses are largely unrelated to characteristics of each question.
As a more complete control for differences across questions, the third column includes separate dummy variables for each question. Most of the coefficients on the individual characteristics remain qualitatively unaffected. The exception is that experts are now found to be significantly less likely to be uncertain. 11 Of course, experts know the existing literature much better, so that this effect is entirely consistent with our null hypothesis that opinions simply reflect the state of the existing academic literature.
The only statistically significant deviation from homogeneous views, therefore, is less caution among men in expressing an opinion, perhaps due to a greater "expert bias". Personality differences rather than different readings of the existing evidence would then explain these gender effects.
We certainly see differences among respondents in the confidence they assign to their responses. To document these differences, we regress an individual's reported confidence on each question against a set of individual characteristics. We include the same individual controls used above, along with dummy variables for the university where the individual is currently employed and also dummy variables for the university where they received their Ph.D. In addition, we added the indicators for questions dealing with market efficiency or distributional issues, and controls for the size of the literature on the question, expecting respondents to be 10 more confident when the literature is large. Table 2 . Respondents are dramatically more confident when the academic literature on the topic is large. Not surprisingly, experts on a subject are much more confident about their answers. The middle-aged cohort (the one closest to the current literature) is the most confident, while the oldest (and wisest) cohort is the least confident. Men and those who have worked in Washington do show some tendency to be more confident. Respondents who got their degrees at Chicago are far more confident than the other respondents, with almost as strong an effect for respondents with Ph.D.'s from MIT and to a lesser extent from Harvard.
Results appear in
Respondents now employed at Yale and to a lesser degree Princeton, MIT, and Stanford seem to be more confident.
Given such clear differences in the confidence expressed by members of the Panel, we therefore included a confidence measure in the last column in Table 1 , defined to equal the individual's average confidence expressed on all questions other than the current question, to avoid possible reverse causation. The intent here is to control for personality differences, so that the remaining variation is more likely to be due to different interpretations of the academic literature. As expected, individuals with a higher mean confidence are less likely to answer that they are uncertain. More confident individuals are also more willing to disagree with the consensus. However, the inclusion of this variable does little to change the coefficients on gender, leaving open the possibility that men tend to interpret the existing literature differently.
The above results estimate the degree to which individuals differ in their likelihood of joining the consensus view on a topic. They provide no evidence, though, on whether individuals group into different schools of thought, agreeing on when to disagree with the consensus. As a first test for the existence of different schools of thought, we examine whether people with similar characteristics provide correlated responses, controlling for the expected pattern of responses coming out of Table 1. In implementing this test, we created a one-dimensional measure of responses with "1" indicating the consensus response, "-1" indicating the opposite response, and "0" indicating a response of "uncertain". The expected value of each individual's response is based on the above multinomial logit model, including just the question dummies.
We then regress the constructed correlation between the responses for each pair of individuals against a vector of dummies capturing shared characteristics: shared experience working in Washington for the same political party, shared experience working in Washington but for different political parties, being faculty in the same Department, having Ph.D.'s from the same school, being members of the same cohort, having the same gender, and sharing expertise. Results are reported in Table 3 . Here we find that pairs of individuals sharing experience working in Washington for the same political party tend to agree with each other. However, if two individuals both worked in Washington but for different political parties, they are no more likely to disagree than are any two members of the sample, undermining support for polarized views even among those who have worked in Washington. The agreement among those working for the same party could simply be shared knowledge about particular policy issues.
Among the other findings, those sharing expertise are much more likely to agree with each other. More striking, though, is that two younger individuals are more likely to disagree than are two individuals from different cohorts; the same is true for two older individuals.
Plausibly, some of the less risk-averse young respond to the professional payoff to successfully challenging existing views. When one is old, there may simply no longer be any professional cost from disagreeing with the consensus. Non-results are also intriguing: there is no tendency 13 for those from the same Ph.D. program or those currently teaching at the same school to agree with each other, contrary to common presumptions.
The results so far do nothing to identify panel members with conservative versus liberal views. To make progress here, we tried two different approaches. In the first, we looked for clusters in the data, using a variety of distance-based clustering methods and several specifications for each method. 12 The data show no systematic evidence of clustering into two or even a few roughly equal-sized camps, yielding only weak evidence that three or four idiosyncratic individuals differ from the rest of the sample, and from each other.
As a second approach, we focused on the subset of questions that we flagged previously as likely to generate disagreements due to distributional concerns or due to debates on the possible importance of market failures. Here, we went a step further and classified one answer as consistent with a "Chicago price theory" perspective, and the other answer as likely reflecting distributional concerns or concerns about market failures or behavioral anomalies. 
